main now requires signed commits, and Gitea refuses to merge a pull request carrying an unsigned one, so the post-release bump PR could not be merged without disabling the protection first. The runner now signs that commit with a dedicated release-bot SSH key held as an organisation Actions secret, trusted by the instance through [repository.signing] TRUSTED_SSH_KEYS. The key Gitea signs merge commits with lives on the server and no runner can reach it. The step fails fast when the secret is missing, unparseable or passphrase protected, and the commit is re-read before pushing so an unsigned one is caught here rather than days later at merge time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
4.3 KiB
CI
CI and release jobs do not install PHP. They run inside the shared images maintained in Unsupervised/ci-php:
git.unsupervised.ca/unsupervised/ci-php:8.1
git.unsupervised.ca/unsupervised/ci-php:8.2
git.unsupervised.ca/unsupervised/ci-php:8.3
git.unsupervised.ca/unsupervised/ci-php:8.5
The Unsupervised org is public, so they pull anonymously — no registry
credentials in any job here. What the images contain, how they are published,
and how to add a PHP version are documented in that repository's README.
Which job runs where
| Job | Runs in |
|---|---|
| Coding Standards (PHPCS) | ci-php:8.3 |
| Static Analysis (PHPStan) | ci-php:8.3 |
| Tests | ci-php:${{ matrix.php }} |
| Build Plugin Zip | ci-php:8.3 |
| No Debug Code | runner image — no PHP, and it uses GNU grep --include |
| Open next-version bump PR (release.yml) | runner image — no PHP |
PHPCS and PHPStan are separate jobs so a coding-standards failure still lets the static analysis result through. They run in parallel.
Composer
composer.lock is committed, so every job installs the same dependency set
and two builds of the same tag ship the same vendor tree. bin/build-zip.sh
stages the lock into its build directory for the same reason, then removes it
before writing the zip.
The Composer download cache lives at /composer/cache — COMPOSER_HOME is
/composer in the image — and is keyed on composer.lock.
Adding a PHP version to the test matrix
The image has to exist first. Add the version to the php matrix in
ci-php's .gitea/workflows/publish.yml and merge, then add it to the test
matrix in .gitea/workflows/ci.yml here.
Signing the version bump commit
main is a protected branch that requires signed commits, and Gitea will not
merge a pull request containing an unsigned one. The bump-version job in
release.yml therefore signs the commit it makes, using a dedicated
release-bot SSH key rather than the key Gitea signs merge commits with —
that one is [repository.signing] SIGNING_KEY on the server and no runner can
reach it. Keeping the CI key separate also means it can be rotated on its own
if the secret ever leaks.
There is deliberately no release-bot Gitea account. A key attached to an
account is only consulted for signature checking after it has been through the
web Verify flow, and that flow has no API — a bot account would need an
interactive login to be worth anything. Listing the key under
TRUSTED_SSH_KEYS instead makes Gitea verify commits signed with it without
any account lookup, which is all the protected branch asks for.
Set up once for the instance, and again only if the key is rotated:
-
Generate a passphrase-less key (it has to be usable unattended):
ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C '[email protected]' -f release-bot -N '' -
Add the public half to
app.iniand restart Gitea:[repository.signing] TRUSTED_SSH_KEYS = ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3Nza... [email protected] -
Store the private half as the organisation Actions secret
RELEASE_BOT_SIGNING_KEY(Org → Settings → Actions → Secrets): the wholerelease-botfile verbatim,-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----header and footer included — not the.pub, and not a GPG export. Organisation secrets are readable assecrets.RELEASE_BOT_SIGNING_KEYfrom every repository in the org, so no repository-level copy is needed. Delete both local files afterwards.
Two consequences of trusting the key instance-wide are worth knowing. Any
commit signed with it verifies in every repository on the instance, not just
these — the trust is in the key, not in a user with permissions you can scope.
And the signature is attributed to SIGNING_NAME / SIGNING_EMAIL, not to the
Release Bot <[email protected]> committer the job sets; that
address backs no account and is only a label.
The job fails fast if the secret is missing or ssh-keygen is absent from the
runner image, and it re-reads the commit it just made to confirm a signature
is attached before pushing — an unsigned bump commit would otherwise look fine
until someone tried to merge the PR.
Nothing else in the pipeline signs anything: release tags are made by a human through Gitea's release UI, and the merge commit is signed by the server when the PR is merged.