Security fixes: CSV injection, policy body output, invite hashing, slot datetimes
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Four fixes from a security review pass: - Neutralise CSV formula injection in the payments export: fields with a leading =, +, -, @, tab, or CR (e.g. a hostile student display name) are apostrophe-prefixed in PaymentReport::csvLine() so they open as text in Excel/Google Sheets. Fixes #39. - Sanitise policy bodies with wp_kses_post at output in PolicyEndpoint::index() (the booking JS renders that HTML raw), so a future write path that forgets kses can never become stored XSS. Fixes #40. - Store invite tokens hashed (SHA-256) at rest: a database leak can no longer redeem pending invites. The registration link is shown once, at creation; the pending list shows email/invited date; lookups hash the submitted token. Existing plaintext pending invites must be re-issued. Fixes #41. - Validate availability slot datetimes on both creation paths (REST and admin form) via AvailabilitySlot::normalizeDateTime(): canonical and datetime-local forms normalise to Y-m-d H:i:s, garbage and end <= start are rejected (REST 400) instead of reaching the DATETIME column or throwing inside the weekly-series date arithmetic. Fixes #42. composer test (204 tests, 594 assertions), PHPStan L6, and PHPCS all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Stored in the `us_registration_mode` option (default `invite`):
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|--------------------|------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
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| `id` | BIGINT UNSIGNED | Primary key |
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| `email` | VARCHAR(191) | Invited email address |
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| `token` | VARCHAR(64) | Opaque token embedded in the registration link |
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| `token` | VARCHAR(64) | SHA-256 hash of the token embedded in the registration link (raw token is never stored) |
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| `role` | VARCHAR(32) | Role granted on acceptance (default `us_student`) |
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| `status` | VARCHAR(20) | `pending` / `accepted` / `revoked` |
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| `invited_by` | BIGINT UNSIGNED | WordPress user ID of the studio admin who invited |
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@@ -34,16 +34,16 @@ recorded in `us_policy_acceptances` with `registration_type = account` and
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`registration_id = <new user ID>`.
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## Flow (invite mode)
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1. Studio admin opens **Invites** (`manage_students`) and invites an email; an invite row is created with a token and a registration link.
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2. The invitee opens `[us_student_register]` with the token (`?us_invite=<token>`).
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1. Studio admin opens **Invites** (`manage_students`) and invites an email; an invite row is created storing the token's SHA-256 hash, and the registration link (with the raw token) is shown **once** in a notice. To re-send a lost link, revoke and re-invite.
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2. The invitee opens `[us_student_register]` with the token (`?us_invite=<token>`); the lookup hashes the submitted token and matches it against the stored hash.
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3. The form pre-fills the email and collects a display name and password, and renders the signup-scoped published policies, each with a required acceptance checkbox.
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4. On submit, the token is re-validated; a `us_student` user is created, the policy acceptances are recorded (`account` type), the invite is marked `accepted`, and the user is logged in.
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4. On submit, the token is re-validated (hashed lookup); a `us_student` user is created, the policy acceptances are recorded (`account` type), the invite is marked `accepted`, and the user is logged in.
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## Admin Interface
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**Invites** in wp-admin (`manage_students`, studio admin only):
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- Select the **registration page** (the page hosting `[us_student_register]`), stored in the `us_registration_page_id` option; invitation links point there (falling back to the home page if unset)
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- Invite an email (creates a pending invite + link)
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- List pending invites; revoke an invite
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- Invite an email (creates a pending invite; the link is displayed once, at creation only)
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- List pending invites (email + invited date); revoke an invite
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## Frontend Shortcode
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- `[us_student_register]` — the registration page. Shows the form for a valid pending invite; otherwise shows an "by invitation only" message (in `invite` mode).
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@@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ offering/duration before selecting a slot to register for.
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`GET` supports query params: `instructor_id`, `offering_id`, `duration_minutes`, `from` (datetime), `to` (datetime).
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`POST` validates `start_dt`/`end_dt` (admin form and REST alike) via
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`AvailabilitySlot::normalizeDateTime()`: the canonical `Y-m-d H:i[:s]` and HTML
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`datetime-local` (`Y-m-d\TH:i[:s]`) forms are normalised to `Y-m-d H:i:s`;
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anything else — or an end not after the start — is rejected (REST responds
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`400 invalid_datetime`; the admin form is a no-op).
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## Implementation
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- Repository: `Unsupervised\Schedular\Availability\AvailabilityRepository`
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- Model: `Unsupervised\Schedular\Availability\AvailabilitySlot`
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@@ -54,6 +54,11 @@ and `instructor_id` query params as the page and returns `text/csv` with a
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`Content-Disposition: attachment` header. Instructor requests are scoped to
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their own rows regardless of `instructor_id`.
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Fields that a spreadsheet would interpret as a formula (leading `=`, `+`, `-`,
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`@`, tab, or CR — e.g. a hostile student display name) are prefixed with an
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apostrophe so the export can never carry CSV formula injection into Excel or
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Google Sheets.
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## Implementation
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- Report aggregator (pure totals + CSV): `Unsupervised\Schedular\Payment\PaymentReport`
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