Merge pull request 'Validate signup email and password strength' (#155) from feature/150-signup-credential-validation into main
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Reviewed-on: #155
This commit was merged in pull request #155.
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@@ -77,6 +77,40 @@ confirmation token's SHA-256 hash is stored; the token expires after 48h
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| `accepted_at` | DATETIME | When accepted; NULL while pending / for group links |
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| `expires_at` | DATETIME | Explicit expiry (end of the chosen day); set on every group link, NULL for personal invites (which expire 14 days after creation) |
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## Email and password validation
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Both are checked on the server on every signup path, and the browser is given a
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matching but *stricter* job so a bad password is caught before submitting.
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**Email** — `type="email"` and `required` in the markup, `is_email()` on the
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server, then `email_exists()` for "an account already exists for this email". A
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personal invite fixes the address and the server always uses the invite's own
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value, so a tampered field is ignored rather than validated.
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**Password** — `Auth\PasswordPolicy` is the authority. It deliberately does
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*not* try to reproduce a strength score in PHP; it rejects the categorically
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bad, which is what a server can check without shipping a dictionary:
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- shorter than `PasswordPolicy::MIN_LENGTH` (8 — NIST SP 800-63B's floor;
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composition rules like "must contain a symbol" are deliberately **not** used,
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as they push people towards predictable substitutions),
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- one of the well-known leaked passwords,
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- built from fewer than four distinct characters (`aaaaaaaa`, `abababab`),
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- containing the user's own display name, email, or the part before the `@`.
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The nuance happens in the browser. `register.js` scores the password with
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zxcvbn through WordPress's own `password-strength-meter` script and refuses to
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submit below `PasswordPolicy::MIN_SCORE` (2 of 4 — "medium"; enough to stop a
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guessable password without demanding a passphrase to book a piano lesson). The
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thresholds reach JavaScript via `wp_localize_script()` from the same constants
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the server enforces, so the two cannot drift apart.
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The verdict is applied with `setCustomValidity()` on the password field rather
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than by disabling a button: the form has up to three submits plus a "Next" that
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already gates on `checkValidity()`, and an invalid field stops all of them
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without any needing to know why. zxcvbn's dictionary loads asynchronously, so
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the gate stays open until it arrives — the server is the check that always runs.
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## Registration Questions (signup step two)
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When the studio has configured **account-scope** registration questions
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(**Offerings → Questions → "Account signup"**, see `registration-questions.md`), the
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