Fix five findings from a security assessment of the plugin

The assessment looked for three things: whether students can reach each
other's bookings, whether payment settings can be dodged, and whether the
plugin opens a way into the rest of the install. The student-isolation and
payment paths held up. These are what did not.

- The front-end login form told WordPress not to work out whether the site
  was secure, so on HTTPS every student's session cookie was issued without
  the Secure flag. wp_signon() only derives it from is_ssl() when the second
  argument is left at its default; an explicit false reads like "no
  preference" and is not.

- The update check took whatever download URL the release API returned and
  handed it to core, which unpacks it over the installed plugin. The package
  must now be https on git.unsupervised.ca exactly, compared on the parsed
  host so a lookalike name cannot pass.

- Uninstalling dropped 2 of 14 tables and left the Stripe secret and webhook
  signing key in wp_options. Removal is now a choice made in advance on
  Access -> Plugin removal: records are kept unless the owner opts in (with a
  typed confirmation), while credentials and the borrowed core registration
  settings go every time.

- Open registration switches on the site-wide users_can_register and makes
  Student the default role, arming any other signup form on the site to mint
  students who could book and be billed immediately. The pending state is now
  decided once, on user_register, rather than by whichever form created the
  account.

- Cancel and withdraw answered "not yours" differently from "does not exist",
  which let a signed-in student enumerate the studio's bookings. Both now
  give the same 404.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-05 11:55:53 -03:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 74df3f5ba8
commit 1847159e31
28 changed files with 1246 additions and 50 deletions
+10 -5
View File
@@ -330,14 +330,19 @@ class BookingEndpoint {
$id = absint( Val::int( $request->get_param( 'id' ) ) );
$lesson = $this->bookings->findById( $id );
if ( null === $lesson ) {
// A booking that is not the caller's is answered exactly as one that does
// not exist. Telling the two apart — 403 here, 404 there — would let any
// signed-in student walk the id space and learn which lessons the studio
// holds, and roughly how many. There is nothing a student can do with
// either answer, so there is no reason to distinguish them.
//
// The booking form's own 403 (see resolveStudent) is a different case: the
// student id there was chosen from a list of people the caller may act for,
// so "not yours" is a correction they need, not a fact they lack.
if ( null === $lesson || ! $this->guardians->canActFor( get_current_user_id(), $lesson->studentId ) ) {
return new \WP_Error( 'not_found', __( 'Booking not found.', 'unsupervised-schedular' ), [ 'status' => 404 ] );
}
if ( ! $this->guardians->canActFor( get_current_user_id(), $lesson->studentId ) ) {
return new \WP_Error( 'forbidden', __( 'You cannot cancel this booking.', 'unsupervised-schedular' ), [ 'status' => 403 ] );
}
if ( Lesson::STATUS_CANCELLED !== $lesson->status ) {
$slot = $this->availability->findById( $lesson->slotId );
if ( null !== $slot ) {