Harden booking, offering exposure, payments, and invites
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Security fixes from a pen-test review (issues #31–#37):

- #31 Booking no longer trusts a client-supplied offering_id: a slot-tied
  offering is authoritative and any offering used must belong to the slot's
  instructor, closing a free/misrouted-payment bypass.
- #34 Availability slot creation rejects an offering the instructor does not
  own (AvailabilityEndpoint now takes OfferingRepository).
- #32 Offering/question/policy listing endpoints now require book_lesson
  instead of being public (no anonymous consumer exists); Offering::toArray
  also omits etransfer_email from listings as defense-in-depth.
- #33 Slots are claimed atomically (UPDATE ... WHERE is_booked = 0) before a
  lesson is inserted, preventing a double-booking race.
- #35 A single weekly booking is capped (MAX_WEEKLY_OCCURRENCES) and only
  creates lessons for slots it actually claimed.
- #36 Stripe secret/webhook keys are write-only in the settings UI and a blank
  submit keeps the stored value; secrets are never echoed back into HTML.
- #37 Pending invites expire after 14 days (Invite::isAcceptable), enforced at
  registration and surfaced on the admin invites list.

Adds BookingEndpointTest plus Invite/Offering/AvailabilityRepository coverage
and minimal WP_REST_Request/WP_REST_Response stubs. composer test (200),
lint, and cs all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-09 17:00:54 -03:00
parent fe43f91fb1
commit 061d09e034
18 changed files with 437 additions and 43 deletions
+34
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ class Invite {
*/
public const VALID_STATUSES = [ self::STATUS_PENDING, self::STATUS_ACCEPTED, self::STATUS_REVOKED ];
/**
* Days a pending invite remains usable after it is created. Limits the window
* in which a leaked or forwarded invitation link can be redeemed.
*/
public const EXPIRY_DAYS = 14;
public function __construct(
public readonly string $email,
public readonly string $token,
@@ -24,6 +30,7 @@ class Invite {
public readonly ?int $invitedBy = null,
public readonly ?int $acceptedUserId = null,
public readonly ?string $acceptedAt = null,
public readonly ?string $createdAt = null,
public readonly ?int $id = null,
) {}
@@ -36,6 +43,7 @@ class Invite {
invitedBy: null !== $row->invited_by ? (int) $row->invited_by : null,
acceptedUserId: null !== $row->accepted_user_id ? (int) $row->accepted_user_id : null,
acceptedAt: $row->accepted_at,
createdAt: $row->created_at ?? null,
id: (int) $row->id,
);
}
@@ -44,6 +52,32 @@ class Invite {
return self::STATUS_PENDING === $this->status;
}
/**
* Whether the invite was created more than {@see EXPIRY_DAYS} ago, measured
* against the supplied current `Y-m-d H:i:s` timestamp. An invite with no
* known creation time is treated as not expired.
*/
public function isExpired( string $now ): bool {
if ( null === $this->createdAt ) {
return false;
}
$created = strtotime( $this->createdAt );
$current = strtotime( $now );
if ( false === $created || false === $current ) {
return false;
}
return ( $current - $created ) > self::EXPIRY_DAYS * 86400;
}
/**
* Whether this invite can still be redeemed: pending and not expired.
*/
public function isAcceptable( string $now ): bool {
return $this->isPending() && ! $this->isExpired( $now );
}
/**
* Returns a plain array representation of the invite.
*